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Prospects for Agricultural Recovery
V . Is Our National Farm Plant Too Large?
B y  Theodore W . Sc h u ltz1
The Agricultural Adjustment Act was passed to correct the 
economic situation that is depressing American agriculture.2 
The aim of the Act is to restore and increase the buying power 
of our farm people. The Act is looked upon as an integral 
part of the whole recovery program of the federal government. 
In general, that part of the recovery program set forth in the 
farm act, is based very largely on the assumption that our na­
tional farm plant is too large—that there is a serious malad­
justment between the output of our farms and the effective 
demand for food and other raw materials produced on farms. 
Farm people, and students of farm problems, are called upon 
to evaluate the soundness of the broad economic policies laid 
down in the Agricultural Adjustment Act. But there can be 
no correct appraisal of these policies without first thoroughly 
understanding the economic data and the economic theory 
which provide the most reasonable explanation of the factors 
responsible for the emergency, and depression in agriculture.3
Some of the more important aspects of the emergency in 
agriculture, as well as certain recovery proposals, were con­
sidered in the 10 circulars prepared by the staff in Economics
1 Many of the statistical data upon which this bulletin is based were col­
lected and compiled by Mr. John A. Downes, graduate assistant in Agricul­
tural Economics. I also wish to thank my colleagues in economics at Iowa 
State College for their valuable criticisms. As practically all of the bulletins 
in this series have been prepared under considerable pressure for time, the 
careful reading and criticisms of members of the staff in Economics have 
helped materially.
2 The Agricultural Adjustment Act which was approved by the President 
May 12, 1933, contains three parts; The first provides measures to increase 
agricultural purchasing power. The second sets up governmental machinery 
to lighten the load of farm mortgages and the third gives to the President cer­
tain broad powers with reference to our national currency and credit. Only 
the first part is under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agriculture, and it 
is tjiis phase of the Farm Recovery Program that is considered in this bulle­
tin. Certain phases of the policies that have been developed by the Farm  
Credit Administration and particularly problems arising out of the refinancing 
of farm land were discussed in the second bulletin of this series. W . G. Mur­
ray has another bulletin (Bui. No. 315, VI. Farm Mortgage Policy) dealing 
with the farm mortgage situation as it exists today in Iowa.
3 Ezekiel, Mordecai, and Bean, Louis, H., Economic Basis for Agricultural 
Adjustment Act. U. S. Dept, of Agr., December, 1933. See foreword by Sec­
retary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace. As the title suggests, this publica­
tion provides a digest of economic data bearing upon the aims of the Agricul­
tural Adjustment Act.
3
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of Iowa State College last year.4 The aim of this bulletin is 
to bring together the more important economic facts that bear 
directly upon the apparent lack of balance between farm sup­
plies and consumer demand. Our task is to determine whether or 
not our national farm plant is too large, and, if so, will a curtail­
ment of agricultural production bring about a better balance 
between agriculture and the non-agriculturak industries ? and, 
will it change the proportion of the national income which 
flows to rural and urban people ?
In considering the economic forces and factors that are de­
pressing American agriculture, it is necessary not only to un­
derstand the emergency, but, it is also essential to go back of 
1929 and determine whether farmers, at that time, were oper­
ating at an economic disadvantage, compared with other 
groups of producers in this country. In order to get at both 
the short and long-time aspects of the farm problem this study 
is divided into two major phases.
The first of these phases covers the period since 1929. In it 
will be considered the effect of the general crisis in trade upon 
agriculture.
The second phase deals with some of the longer-run eco­
nomic factors affecting American agriculture. Since it is our 
purpose to follow through some of the consequences of the 
World War, this period covers the two decades since 1914.
AG R IC U LT U R A L  CONSEQUENCES OF T H E  G E N E R A L  
CRISIS IN  T R A D E  SIN CE 1929
THE PRODUCTION SIDE
One of the chief characteristics of a trade crisis is declining 
prices. We shall, therefore, begin by taking up the effect of 
a rapidly, falling price level upon agriculture. Commodity 
prices started their downward spiral toward the close of 1929.
4 These 10 circulars were published under the general title, “The Agricul­
tural Emergency in Iowa,” Circulars 139 to 148, inclusive: Cir. 139, I. 
The Situation Today;'Cir. 140. II. The Causes of the Emergency (out of 
print) ; Cir. 141, III. The Voluntary Domestic Allotment Plan (out of print) ; 
Cir. 142, IV. Iowa Farm Mortgage Situation; Cir. 143, V. Control of the Gen­
eral Price Level; Cir. 144, VI. The Iowa Tax Situation— An Analysis for 
Farmers; Cir. 145, VII. Monetary Inflation (out of print) ; Cir. 146, VIII. 
How Tariffs Affect Farm Prices; Cir. 147, IX . Farm Mortgage Foreclosures; 
Cir. 148, X . Shrink Agriculture or Shift Tariff Protected Industries. These 
circulars were later re-edited and published as a book by the Collegiate Press, 
Inc., of Iowa State College. This book, The A gricultural E m ergen cy in Iowa, 
contains 216 pages and sells for 75 cents.J
4
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For nearly 4 years they continued to fall, with minor inter­
ruptions, until late last spring when there occured one of the 
most spectacular speculative rises in prices, particularly in 
grains, ever known. Prior to this, commodity prices had been 
declining not only in the United States but the world over; 
and, while the price -structures of the world were sagging, 
prices- of farm commodities fell faster and farther than those 
of any other major group.
Our query at this point is, what happens to agricultural pro­
duction as a direct consequence of rapidly declining farm com­
modity prices? What are the alternatives and what is the 
nature of the response, for example, of wheat growers in Can­
ada, Argentina, Australia and in our own wheat regions, Kan­
sas and North Dakota, when such growers face a downward 
spiral of prices such as has recently occurred?
Experience, here as well as abroad, is that farmers, whether 
growing wheat or any other crop or livestock, do not reduce 
their production when prices fall. There is, in fact, much eco­
nomic pressure upon the individual farmer to increase his out­
put. Even bankruptcy, liquidating as it does individual pro­
ducers, seldom reduces the size of the farm plant as a whole. 
If an insurance company takes over a farm, more likely than 
not, the former owner-operator becomes the tenant. Then, 
there is the effect of industrial unemployment, a by-product 
of depression, which forces many city workers back to the 
farm, thus increasing the farm labor supply.
A brief examination of the more important characteristics 
of the farm enterprise helps explain why farmers cannot of 
their own choice reduce production. In the first place, there 
are over 6 million farmers in the United States. An individual 
farmer produces only an infinitestimal fraction of the total crop. 
Take for example a representative Iowa farmer harvesting 2,200 
bushels of corn. He produces less than one-millionth of the 
domestic crop.5 Obviously, under such circumstances, it mat­
ters little whether a particular farmer cuts or expands his
6 An Iowa farmer operating a 160-acre farm puts in about 55 acres of 
eorn which on the average yields 40 bushels per acre producing therefore, 
A¿00 bushels. This, ,however, is considerably less than one-millionth of the 
total corn crop which averages for the United States. 2,600.000.000 bush­
els. in turn, thè domestic production represents approximately 60 percent of 
’■ee total world output, and corn is only one of several feed crops which are 
readily substituted one for another.
5
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operations. His action, by itself, has no measureable effect 
upon the total supply and hence upon the price of corn. No 
one believes that a single farm enterprise is large enough to 
be of any consequence in influencing the price of its products 
through the supply side of the market. Note, however, that 
this is in striking contrast to much of industrial production 
wherein the amount produced is governed with the intent, 
during a depression for example, of maintaining the selling 
price of the commodity. It is characteristic for agriculture to 
be faced with maintained production and low prices during 
a depression. In contrast, industry bomplains of factories not 
in operation, excess plant capacity and unemployment. In 
agriculture, production is maintained; in industry, the price 
of the commodity sold is largely maintained.
Capital Invested in the Farm Enterprise
Land, once in cultivation, is abandoned very slowly and cap­
ital improvements added to farm land assumes a relatively 
fixed form. Investment in drainage or irrigation, clearance of 
stumps and stones, roads, and to a lesser degree, fences and 
buildings, are all practically immovable. These are capital in­
vestments. They cannot be shifted. Consequently, contrac­
tion in agriculture, to the extent that it involves a shifting of 
capital investments, is slow and fraught with difficulty. Even 
though alternative opportunities are available, which certainly 
is not the case during a general depression, farmers are not in 
a position to abandon capital investment without assuming a 
greater loss than if they continued to farm. The length of 
fjme that it takes to liquidate a portion of the farm plant 
through a process of low prices is not a matter of years but of 
decades.
Farm Labor Supply
In the case of labor the farmer again finds himself unable to 
make any savings in cost by curtailing production. Since 
farm work is done chiefly by the operator and his family the 
supply of labor cannot be reduced significantly. Obviously, 
one cannot discharge his. family—much less himself. The 
family, moreover, is the fundamental economic unit in farm-
6
Bulletin, Vol. 27 [1933], No. 314, Art. 1
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/bulletin/vol27/iss314/1
95 (t
ing in which the wife is virtually essential to success. In con­
trast, it is one of the weaknesses of our economic system, that 
manufacturers are able to transfer much of the burden of de­
clining prices and restricted demand to workers by reducing 
payrolls and by discharging laborers. Here the individual work­
er, not his family, is the basic economic unit where the human 
factor is concerned.
A glance at the 1930 Census further suggests why the 
amount of labor available for farming is so inflexible. The Cen­
sus shows that less than half of the farm operators in the Unit­
ed States employ any labor whatsoever. Much of the labor 
that is hired on farms is part-time employment. Frequently, 
it is one neighbor helping another over peak loads, filling silos, 
threshing and putting up hay.6
Furthermore, the “ back to the farm”  drift of the last few 
years of large numbers of city unemployed cannot be disre­
garded. Unemployed people have returned to the farm where 
at least food and shelter are forthcoming. As a consequence, 
the farm population, which had been shrinking for many years, 
increased by 2 million persons from 1929-33. This increase 
in farm labor has and will, for some years, tend to maintain 
or even increase farm production.
The Curse of High Fixed Charges
There is little.doubt that in the short run, rapidly falling 
prices place much pressure upon farmers not only to maintain 
but actually to increase their production of crops and livestock. 
When the price of corn falls, the grower has only one way by 
which he can maintain his income, and that is, by increasing 
the amount that he has to sell.. The reason why he must main­
tain his income arises chiefly from the fact that farming is sub­
ject to relatively high fixed charges relative to the total cost 
of operations. In an earlier study, it was pointed out why 
high fixed charges tend to bring about more intensive cultiva­
tion.7
6 The 1930 Census reports 6,289,000 farm operators of which 2,632,000 in­
dicated that they hired some farm labor during 1929. Of those reporting 
labor, the employment for 1929 averaged 156 days.
7 Black, A. G. The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa. I. The Situation 
Today. Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta., Cir. 139 :6 and 7. 1932.
7
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Fig. 1. The decline in Iowa farm prices and the response that 
farmers of Iowa have shown in their production of selected farm com­
modities during the depression.
Suffice it to say that regardless of whether a farm is operat­
ed at full or part of its productive capacity the cost of running 
it remains about the same. Payment of interest, principal on 
mortgages, taxes and other debts, bulk large. While the re­
turns per acre for 1932-33 were about 60 percent less than in 
the pre-war years, the average mortgage debt per acre was
TABLE t. PRICES PAID TO PRODUCERS AND PRODUCTION OF SELECTED 
FARM PRODUCE IN IOWA, 1925 TO 1933.»
Corn Oats Hogs Total Crops*
Price Price Price
per Acres per Acres per No. of head in- Acresbu. bu. cwt. dex
1925 .86 11,234,317 .39 6,221,070 11.08 10,882,512 147 18,600,8771926 .60 11,170,154 .34 6,217,972 11.62 10,675,479 141 18,571,0001927 .74 10,901,380 .41 6,000,894 9.49 11,551,093 140 18,396,0001928 .81 11,202,127 .43 6,003,792 8.61 13,125,056 145 18,870,0001929 .77 10,882,853 .39 5,997,382 9.48 12,326,623 147 18,553,4281930 .69 11,165,548 .33 6,253,842 8.80 12,179,960 127 18,522,0001931 .44 11,732,000 .21 6,120,000 5.64 13,075,808 86 19,093,7181932 .23 11,849,000 .15 6,181,000 3.21 12,518,000 56 19,150,8271933 .26 11,138,000 .21 6,119,000 3.37 11,970,000 57 18,406,400
Ui u u c  v i u y  AuejJL,’!  w x ig  D u a r u  u i  I o w a ,  U .  D . JL^ept. 01  A S T . ,  JDUI
of Agr. Ec. , J.
^Includes corn, oats, wheat, barley, rye, flaxseed, timothy seed, clover, soybeans, potatoes 
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Fig. 2. The decline in United States farm prices and the response 
that farmers have shown in their production of selected classes of live­
stock during the depression.
nearly three times higher, and taxes about twice as high as 
before 1914.8 The farm mortgage—amounting to more than 
a billion dollars in Iowa alone—even though it represents cap­
italized rent,9 once it is assumed as a contractual obligation 
tends to force the producer to maximize his receipts. This 
form of economic pressure, in a period such as the present, 
frequently forces farmers to mine their soil with complete dis­
regard of all principles of soil management or the future needs 
of society. Nor is the farmer to blame. Enough income must 
be forthcoming to meet interest and amortized payments on the 
principal when they fall due. For, if he fails to meet these 
obligations, he loses all that has been invested in the enter­
prise through forced liquidation.10
8 Ezekiel and Bean. Economic Basis for Agricultural Adjustment Act. 
(Cited earlier in footnote 3.)
9 The reader will perceive that I refer here to economic rent, namely, the 
value of the productivity of a given piece of land over no rent land, some­
times referred to as site value.
10 Insolvent farmers in turn lead to bank failures. That the agricultural 
regions were depressed before 1929 is indicated by the large number of bank 
failures in rural regions all through the years since 1920. By the end of 1930 
the number of small country banks in operation had fallen to less than two- 
thirds of the 1922 level. Moreover, deposits were either drawn down ma­
terially, destroyed or tied,up.
9
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Farm Cannot Shut Down
In spite of the collapse of farm prices it is evident that agri­
cultural production has been maintained throughout. Farm­
ers do not curtail their crops or their livestock. Conversely, 
directors of factories stop their engines and close their doors. 
Their workers are discharged, and thus forced to join the 
ranks of the unemployed. The farm, however, when prices 
fall, no matter to what ruinously low depths, is not allowed to 
stand idle. Farm products continue to flow, to market and 
must be handled. Unless they are wasted, they must be stored, 
processed or moved into consumption. The reasons for this 
are many. The fact, however, that in present-day economic 
society, factories stop while farms continue to produce, when 
prices collapse, is an important phenomenon that should be 
considered when establishing policies, the aim of which is to 
overcome a depression. The belief, that in the short run, low 
prices for farm products automatically reduce supplies to a 
point where prices again cover cost of production is certainly 
not borne out by experience.
If the general depression in trade were the only factor respon­
sible, for the maladjustments between farm supplies and demand, 
it would seem much more reasonable, in view of the fact that agri­
cultural production has increased but slightly, to expand indus­
trial. production rather than to attempt to curtail farm produc­
tion. In looking at production alone, the cure for the economic 
disease referred to as a trade crisis is a matter of bringing about 
industrial activity so non-agricultural producers have more to 
exchange for the goods and services they want.
THE CONSUMPTION SIDE
Is our surplus problem in agriculture essentially due to re­
duced consumption growing out of unemployment and smaller in­
dustrial payrolls? How significant is the close relationship 
that seems to exist between the prices that farmers receive 
and the wages which workmen are paid? To what extent is 
the prosperity of agriculture dependent largely upon the pros­
perity of our manufacturing industries? These and related 
questions are considered in the following paragraphs.
10




In discussing the demand for farm commodities, it is neces­
sary to distinguish between food and non-food products. The 
demand for butter and bacon, for example, is much different 
from the demand for cotton and flaxseed. The first represents 
foods, and the other non-ffood commodities. Foods have cer­
tain characteristics as a class. They are consumed regularly, 
and the total amount consumed does not change much—de­
pression or prosperity. Whether a New Era is heralded or a 
Banking Holiday proclaimed, the human stomach neither con­
tracts nor expands appreciably. We want and need food 
three times a day; and, in most western countries most people 
reach a point of satiation in food, thrice daily. Food is usually 
the last item in the family budget to be curtailed. It is be­
cause of these characteristics that the demand for food is re­
ferred to as being inelastic in character.11 Although the, de­
mand for individual food products varies in elasticity the de­
mand for food products as a whole is strictly inelastic.
Raw Materials Made From Farm Products
The demand for farm produce used as raw materials in making 
non-food products is much more elastic than the demand for food. 
Accordingly, the quantity of cotton, wool, linen and silk; jute 
and hemp; flaxseed and soybeans, which is used, is much, more 
subject to the influence of booms and depressions than is the 
demand for food.
The purchase of most manufactured goods can be postponed 
readily, in bad times.12 Take for example, the demand for lin­
seed oil. During hard times, new buildings are not construct­
ed and old buildings, although badly weatherworn, are not 
repainted. Painting comes to' a standstill. Linseed oil goes 
begging for a market. Consequently, the amount of flaxseed 
that is crushed for oil drops precipitously. Thus we find that
11 Technically, a demand curve is said to be inelastic when the proportion­
ate change in price is greater than the change in quantity taken. When a 
one-percent increase or decrease in price results in less than a one-percent 
change in the amount that buyers will take, the demand is inelastic in char­
acter. The demand for salt, sugar, bread are examples. A  demand curve is 
elastic when a one-percent variation in price results in more than a one-per­
cent change in quantity taken.
Jp ,1.2 See Shepherd, Geoffrey S. Prospect for Agricultural Recovery. IV. 
■¡National Economic Planning, Iowa Agr, Exp. Sta., Bui 313, 1934, for a more 
complete discussion of the characteristic of durable consumer goods.
11
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the domestic disappearance of flaxseed is highly sensitive to 
business conditions. Take another illustration—an old suit of 
clothes or an old automobile tire usually can be used a while 
longer than is customary. Then, too, fabrics are not as strictly 
necessities of life as is food, and because fabrics are durable, 
the quantity that is utilized during any given period of time 
varies considerably, depending upon the state of business.
Some farm products provide both raw materials and food­
stuffs. Cattle supply meat and leather; sheep give us mutton 
and wool; and, while the bulk of the corn crop is used as feed, 
some is consumed as food and some is made into industrial 
products. The demand for agricultural commodities as a 
whole depends upon how much of the total production is com­
posed of foods and how much of it is used as raw material. The 
ratio between these two for the United States is shown by the 
sources of income of farmers. The cash income from farm 
production during 1924-28 averaged 9,739 million dollars13 of 
which 1,960 million dollars or about one-fifth came from the 
sale of non-food products.14 Roughly, then, 20 percent 
of our farm products may be characterized, as having 
elastic demands, while the demands for the rest are inelastic. 
Accordingly, we would expect the consumption of about four- 
fifths of our farm production to change relatively little, in spite 
of depression.
Consumption of Farm Produce During Boom and Depression
Figure 3 gives the per person changes in domestic consump­
tion of 10 selected farm commodities for the period from 1927 
to 1933. This chart is constructed so that the average level of 
consumption that prevailed during 1927-29 equals 100. Hence, 
the chart gives the relative (in percentage of 1927-29) yearly 
variations in consumption since 1927.
First take the non-food group. The per person disappear­
ance of cotton in 1932 was down to 70 percent of its 1927-29 
level; flaxseed, even more sensitive to depression, dropped to 
less than half (41 percent); and, tobacco which was off slightly
18 U. S. Dept, of Agr., Yearbook of Agriculture. 1932. p. 891. A  sum of 
182 million dollars credited to forest products was deducted from the total 
figure appearing in the Yearbook.
14 The non-food group includes cotton lint, cottonseed, tobacco, wool, flax­
seed, horses and mules, mohair, and broomcorn.
12
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Fig. 3. Relative changes in the level of consumption of 10 selected 
foods in the United States from 1927 to 1933.
less stood at 84 percent. During prosperity (1925-1929) we 
used annually 32 million acres of non-food products in the 
United States compared with only 24 million acres during the 
depression period (1932-33), a decline of 25 percent.
In contrast with the non-food group of farm commodities, 
the level of consumption of food has not declined during the 
depression. On the basis of the per person consumption of the 
prosperous period of 1925-29, it is estimated that it would re­
quire about 284 million acres of crop land at average yields to 
supply the food for the present population of 125 million peo­
ple. A study of the level of consumption that has obtained 
during the depression period .of 1932-33, shows that we con­
sumed an amount of food requiring exactly the same crop acre­
age as would have been needed for the 1925-29 level of con­
sumption.15 While it goes without saying that many of our
15 H. R. Tolley. The Problem of Long-Time Agricultural Adjustment. An 
address at Farmers’ Week, Ohio State University, -Columbus, Ohio, Jan. 31, 
1934. Mr. Tolley’s data are based on an interesting study being made by F. 
F. Elliott. Mr. Elliott is trying to ascertain the crop acreage that would be 
required to produpe enough food to give the American people certain diets 
worked out by the home economic experts: (1) A  restricted diet for emer­
gency purposes, (2) an adequate diet at minimum cost, (3) an adequate diet 
at moderate cost, and (4) a liberal diet.
13
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rural as well as urban people have not and cannot afford an 
adequate diet, it is true that the depression has not reduced 
the level of consumption of food from that which prevailed 
just prior to 1929.
The consumption of certain foods, of course, has declined, 
but that of others has increased? There is plenty of evidence 
of substitution. But there always is, for housewives tend to 
buy the cheap and abundant, and economize on the dear and 
the scarce foods. For instance, the consumption of oranges 
and grapefruit has gone up considerably while that of lemons, 
apples and bananas has declined sharply. Or take lard and its 
substitutes. The consumption of lard has increased during the 
depression, while that of vegetable oils and shortenings has 
dropped nearly a fourth. Consumption of rice and sweet pota- 
tatoes has increased; that of flour and potatoes has dropped. 
More will be said about selected commodities below. It is evi­
dent that the changes in the amount of particular foods con­
sumed throws little light upon what happens to the diet of con­
sumers in general. It is quite apparent that particular in­
creases or decreases are due, chiefly, ,to changes in production. 
A large crop, especially of perishable produce, or a heavy run 
of livestock, is almost always followed by an increase in con­
sumption. Unless wasted or stored, it must be sold at some 
price. Short crops, on the other hand, require the curtailment 
of consumption. Short run shifts in per capita consumption 
between foods, therefore, whether during depression or pros­
perity, are the result primarily of variations in supply.
That the level of food consumption as a whole has not changed 
materially since 1927 is further illustrated in fig. 3. Take 
meats : while the per capita consumption of beef and veal de­
clined, until last year, that for lamb and mutton went up over 
20 percent. But for all meats taken together, there was very 
little change. The slight decline that is shown is chiefly at­
tributable to the increase in iffin-commercial and farm slaugh­
ter, which does not appear in our federal statistics. The level 
of flour consumption has receded which is in line with the post­
war trend in the use* of bread. Dairy products have held fair­
ly steady, although they have not advanced as much as has 
been their tendency since the war. Dr. 0. E. Baker points
14
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TABLE 2. APPARENT PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION IN UNITED STATES OF 10 










































1927 31.32 1.06 6.24 4.15 12.59 106.3 56.73 45.34 4.26 177.7
1928 27.43 1.01 6.22 4.12 12.43 105.7 61.15 40.14 4.37 179.9
1929 28.98 1.01 6.43 3.78 12.82 104.5 60.06 39.89 4.52 175.5
1930 21.81 .69 6.22 3.97 13.09 100.2 56.16 38.76 5.27 166.6
1931 21.95 .69 5.98 4.49 13.73 100.9 56.86 38.48 5.56 165.0
1932 20.09 .42 5.32 4.23 13.03 98.9 58.08 35.38 5.46 166.4
1933 25.73 .47 4.18 13.02 103.4 57.65 40.01 5.39
Source:
Data for cheese, creamery butter, meats and cotton from survey of Current Business, U. 
S. Dept, of Com.
Data for wheat flour from, Wheat Studies, Stanford University; 10: 136. 1933.
Data for tobacco from, Stat. Abst. of 1933. U. S. Dept, of Com.
Annual mid-year estimâtes of population (1927-1932) are taken from Stat. Abst. of 1932, 
U. S. Dept, of Com.
According to data of new series compiled by U. S. Dept, of Agr., Bur. of Agr. Ec., in 
Survey of Current Business, June, 1933, p. 19. Estimates of farm butter production are ex­
cluded, actual factory output being taken, together with imports and exports and the difference
in cold storage holdings.
* Apparent consumption, including only meat produced under federal inspection, has been 
computed by the U. S. Dept, of Agr., Bur. of Agr. Ec., from the inspected slaughter, less con­
demned animals plus net imports less exports, and the change in cold storage holdings.
*For years (July-June).
out that the consumption of dairy and sugar products increas­
ed notably following prohibition and that it is probable that 
these products will decline somewhat with the return of beer.
The following conclusions appear reasonable with reference 
to the short run or first phase of the farm problem.
1. Farmers have continued to produce during the depres­
sion at the same rate at which they did during the more pros­
perous period that preceded 1930.
2. The American people, as a whole, have continued to con­
sume as much food per person since the depression set in as 
during the prosperous period of 1925-29. The fact that the 
level of consumption has not declined within the United States 
during the depression is highly important, since food repre­
sents about four-fifths of our total farm production.
3. The domestic disappearance of non-food farm products, 
in contrast, has been reduced about 25 percent because of the 
depression. Cotton, cottonseed, tobacco, wool, flaxseed, horses 
and mules, mohair and broomcorn, the leading non-food prod­
ucts, make up( approximately one-fifth of the output of our 
farms.
15
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TABLE 3. ESTIMATED DOMESTIC STOCKS OF SELECTED FARM COMMODITIES .
(In thousands of units)
Commodity Pre War 1930 1933
Wheat (bu.) 96,872» 242,000 240,000
Cotton (bales) 1,366» 2,312 7,918s
Lard (lbs.) 63,304s 82,098 132,297
Cottonseed oil (lbs.) 335,993s 227,837 676,163
Apples (bu.) 11,229s 23,902 21,393
Pork (lbs.) 420,736s 620,986 627,323
Beef (lbs.) 147,811s 103,883 79,172
Mutton and lamb (lbs.) 4,976s 5,317 3,193
Poultry (lbs.) 32,184» * 140,723 123,479
Eggs (doz.) 43,170s 67,110 74,700
Butter (lbs.) 48,977s 81,935 111,210
Cheese (lbs.) 41,594s 86,075 91,994
»Wheat, 1909-13; cotton, 1914-15. 
sJan. 1, 1916.
»1927.
4 Jan 1, 1917.
{Jan. 1,1922.
6Year beginning Aug. 1, 1932.
From the above summary statement it would appear that the 
large accumulated stocks of non-perishable foodstuffs in the 
United States are not primarily the result of low wages and 
unemployment. Most of these stocks were already excessively 
large when prices collapsed. Whatever increase there has been 
since 1929 is not to be attributed to reduced consumption, as a 
whole, but to the further shrinking of foreign demand and, in 
some cases, to increased production. It also follows, that if, 
and when, business conditions improve, with its better payrolls 
and more employment, the total amount of food consumed in 
the United States is not likely to increase by more than the in­
crease in population.
Conversely, the large stocks of non-food farm produce are 
partly the result of reduced domestic consumption. The do­
mestic carryover of cotton, for example, rose from 2.3 million 
bales in August, 1930, to 7.9 million bales in 1932. Moreover 
the amount of cotton, tobacco and flaxseed that will be used by 
textile mills, tobacco houses and oil crushers is likely to in­
crease considerably with improvement in business. In fact, 
the disappearance of cotton attained practically normal pro­
portions during the last half of 1933.
FARM PRICES AND INDUSTRIAL WAGES 
DURING THE DEPRESSION
While the amount of food that the American people eat dur­
ing prosperous and depression periods does not vary, the prices
16
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paid for food and, hence, the income which the farmers receive, 
appear to be closely connected with the rise and fall of wages. 
Since most farm products which are produced for sale and 
which go into domestic consumption are used by non-farm peo­
ple, the prices they pay, presumably, reflects their purchasing 
power. Since much of the purchasing power of our city popu­
lation comes directly from manufacturing, any curtailment or 
expansion of industrial activity changes the ability of urban 
people to buy food. Payrolls and food prices, in a general way, 
have gone hand in hand. But, both are parts of an economic 
system, sufficiently large to dominate the economic position of 
its several components.
It should be made clear, therefore, that although farm in­
comes have declined about as much as wages have fallen, since 
1929, it does not follow that wages which workers receive is the 
only, or even the chief, determinant of farm prices in the 
United States. Take first the non-food group of farm products. 
Farmers, as well as city people, are buyers of the finished prod­
ucts that are made from non-food farm produce. When farm­
ers curtail the painting of their buildings, as in recent years, it 
very materially reduces the demand for linseed oil. Cotton and 
woolen goods are important in the purchases of both rural and 
city people. In the case of foods, agriculture itself is an im­
portant factor in the demand. Whether farmers use butter or 
oleomargarine depends, among other things, upon their income. 
Whether cotton planters produce their own hogs, or buy the 
fat backs and sow bellies which they need, from the Corn Belt, 
depends very largely upon cotton prices. Because of the re­
gional specialization that characterizes American agriculture, 
individual farmers are far from being self-sufficient in food. 
Therefore, in food as well as in non-food products, the cotton, 
wheat, corn, tobacco, fruit, dairy and livestock producers are 
all interdependent. But the distortion of prices and costs 
caused by the drastic decline in prices has been breaking down 
regional specialization and the widespread interchange of farm 
products. This breaking down of regional specialization is 
most acute in the bulky products, and is primarily due to the 
inflexibility oB transportation costs. Farmers in cash crop 
areas, for example, have expanded their acreage of food and
17
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feed crops.16 Thus it is clear that the well-being of one farm 
group affects the economic status of the other, both in what is 
produced and in what is purchased for consumption.
Moreover, in considering the short run phase of the farm 
situation, it is highly important not to overlook or underesti­
mate the influence of the export market upon domestic farm 
prices. The prices which farmers receive from many of their 
leading crops and livestock products, even though the bulk of 
the production is consumed in this country, is determined, pri­
marily, by world prices. Farm prices of export products have 
dropped much more than the farm prices of the remaining prod­
ucts. At the beginning of 1933, farmers dependent upon for­
eign outlets were selling their produce for about 40 percent of 
pre-war prices, while those producing commodities on a domes­
tic or import basis were receiving about 80 percent of their pre­
war prices. The excessive accumulated stocks of farm produce 
are largely in exportable products.17 This aspect of the farm 
problem is discussed in the next section.
SUMMARY OF THE SHORT RUN OR DEPRESSION PHASE
Without attempting to analyze the several factors that have 
contributed most to bringing about the drastic decline in prices 
and trade, it is possible from the preceding discussion to ob­
serve certain economic relationships between agricultural and 
non-agricultural groups. Food prices.and farm prices are low 
partly because wages are low and partly because farm produc­
tion has not been contracted during the depression. Since food, 
however, is the last item in the family budget to be economized, 
it is reasonable to suppose, that had the supplies of food been 
curtailed a much larger share of the average family budget 
would have gone for food. But instead what actually has hap­
pened, is that, by and large, the American people have spent 
less of their income for food since 1929 than during the more 
prosperous years.
18 The changes in regional specialization have been most marked in vege­
tables and other specialty crops. From 1929 to 1933 the acreage of canning 
crops declined 31 percent while the acreage in truck crops increased 15 per­
cent and the acreage in vegetable gardens for nearby sale also increased ma­
terially. Ezekiel and Bean. Cited earlier, p. 13.
17 Schultz, Theodore W . The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa. VIII. 
How Tariffs Affect Farm Prices. Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta., Cir, 146 :153-154. 1933.
18
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While it is true that a large number of families in the United 
States have been forced to curtail their expenditures most dras­
tically and have thereby been forced to a poorer diet, others, in 
fact many large occupational groups, especially those having 
fixed sources of income, have found the food which they have 
bought costing them relatively less than before the depression. 
This latter group has improved its diet enough to offset the cur­
tailment in diet among those less fortunate. The fact that food 
prices dropped more than our national income, at least sug­
gests that food for the American people as a whole, has been 
cheaper (requiring less of the total budget) during the depres­
sion than prior to 1930. This very largely explains why we 
have not reduced our diet, as a whole, in spite of the worst de­
pression in our history.
Nor are the American people likely to eat more, if, and when, 
prosperity returns. The reverse of the depression process, in 
all probability, will take place. Those groups in our society 
whose incomes are least affected by rising prices will curtail 
their consumption of food somewhat. Others, however, whose 
incomes rise as fast or faster than food prices, will improve 
their diet. This is not to say that the purchasing power of 
wage earners is not an important factor in determining how 
high food prices may go before the wage earner, as a consumer, 
is forced to a poorer diet. It is certainly true that profitable 
farming requires consumers who are not only willing but also 
able to buy.
Attention is once more called to the fact that the gigantic 
stocks of farm produce, other than non-food commodities, that 
have accumulated in this country are not primarily the result 
of reduced wages, unemployment and business depression in 
our cities. But, the pressure of these unprecedented stocks 
upon both domestic and foreign prices partly explains why it 
has not been necessary for consumers, as a whole, to spend a 
larger proportion of their income in buying food. But more 
important in evaluating the fundamental policies of the agri­
cultural adjustment act, is the fact that a return of better times 
in business generally will not relieve agriculture of its burden­
some surpluses, of foodstuffs. Farm prices would undoubtedly 
increase, but farm supplies would still continue to be out of ad-
19
Schultz: Prospects for agricultural recovery V. Is our national farm plant
Published by Iowa State University Digital Repository, 1933
108
justment with demand, here and abroad. Agriculture would 
still continue to operate under a cloud. The sought-for balance 
between agricultural and industrial production would not have 
been attained. To get at the causes for the accumulated stocks, 
it is necessary to understand fully the foreign situation.
D ISLO CATIO N S IN  AG R IC U LT U R A L  PR O D U CTIO N  
A N D  T R A D E  G R O W IN G  OUT OF T H E  W O R L D  W A R
Our discussion thus far has dealt only with the impact of the 
recent trade crises upon agriculture. Large parts, if not all, 
of agriculture was indeed sick long before 1929. Depression, 
especially among those farmers dependent upon foreign out­
lets for the sale of their produce, had been more or less chronic 
since the war. Unrest among the farmers, not to say a spirit 
of revolt, grew out of this condition.
The unfavorable economic position of farmers generally was 
attributed to many and varied causes. Accordingly, an almost 
equal number of reform proposals were offered to aid agricul­
ture.
Farm Relief From 1920 to 1929
The history of agricultural reform which followed the sharp 
price decline of 1920 is crowded with one relief plan after an­
other. Some of these plans were considered by Congress. A 
few of them were enacted.
First came tariff legislation. Farmers generally believed that 
the sudden collapse of farm prices, in the fall of 1920, 
which continued into 1921, was due largely to the then pending 
imports, chiefly of Canadian and Argentine origin.  ^ Conse­
quently, Congressmen from the farm states at once insisted on 
higher tariffs j and much to their surprise, representatives of 
the industrial East were only too glad to join hands with the 
spokesmen of agriculture in a general raising of tariffs. The 
Emergency Tariff Act was passed in 1921. It was soon followed 
by more tariff increases in the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act 
of 1922. But the prices of the principal farm products—cotton, 
wheat and hogs; tobacco, rice and apples; rye, prunes and the 
coarse feed grains, all strictly on an export basis strangely 
enough, did not show any favorable price response to the
20
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change in tariff policy. The domestic producers, however, of 
certain chemicals and dyestuffs prospered from the upward re­
vision of duties.
McNary-Haugen Plan
Next came the McNary-Haugen proposal which was based 
upon the equalization fee principle. Twice it received the ap­
proval of both houses of Congress, but on each occasion it was 
vetoed by President Coolidge. The export debenture plan was 
also considered. Many lesser proposals to aid farmers were 
considered. Among those enacted into law was the Purnell 
Act passed in 1925. In addition to these national measures, 
conferences were called, particularly by governors from agri­
cultural states. Executive committees were set up, and busi­
nessmen, through the National Industrial Conference Board, 
also studied the economic problems of the farmer.
Farm Board
In 1929, largely as a result of political compromises, an act 
was passed providing for the Federal Farm Board. The pur­
pose of the act was “ to promote the effective merchandising 
of agricultural commodities ’ ’ so that agriculture would be 
‘ f placed on a basis of economic equality with other industries ’ ’ 
and to “ protect, control and stabilize”  the marketing of agri­
cultural commodities. The same Congress enacted the Smoot- 
Hawley Tariff Act. In passing, it should be noted that the 
Farm Board started its stabilization operation, ironically 
enough, just at the time when prices of raw materials, the 
world over, started to collapse.
From the preceding sketch of the plans that were proposed 
to aid agriculture, plans that were prominent prior to 1929, 
it is evident that the representatives of agriculture were re­
flecting the discontent of farmers; for, as already indicated, 
farmers generally held that they were operating at a disad­
vantage compared with other important economic groups. 
Moreover, should one take the time to study the statistics 
pertaining to farm income and farm purchasing power, one 
would soon discover that most farm families have received 
relatively low incomes since 1920. While the total national 
income dropped from about 74 billion, in 1920, to 63 billion
21
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Fig. 4. Estimated total and per person national and farm income 
the United States from 1919 to 1932.
dollars in 1921, a, drop of 15 percent; farm income dropped 
from 11 billion to less than 7 billion dollars, during the same 
period, a decline of 36 percent. Following this the estimated 
national income increased steadily until in 1929 it stood at 91 
billion dollars. Farm income, however, showed but little im­
provement. During the boom period—1927 to 1929—the yearly 
farm income was only slightly more than 8 billion dollars.18
That American agriculture did not benefit materially from 
the recovery and prosperity of the decade following the close 
of the war is even more forcefully shown when we compare 
the proportion that the farm income represented of the total 
national income.' In- 1919 the farm income made up over 18 
percent of the total; it fell to less than 15 percent in 1920; it
18 The more critical reader undoubtedly will not be satisfied with the gen­
eral statement that just because the share of the national income that has 
flowed to agriculture has declined, therefore, it has not prospered as much as 
the remainder of society. The costs of production in farming may have been 
reduced and/or the number of farms declined enough to more than offset the 
relative contraction in total income. Under such circumstances instead of 
less buying power the individual farmer would have increased his purchasing 
power, hence his economic position. In all probability farmers in some sec­
tions of the United States and individual farmers in nearly every region have 
not lost but gained ground, even through the depression. These, however, 
have been the exception rather than the rule. The decline in farm real estate 
values, the increase in farm mortgages and taxes, the general lack of farm 
improvements since 1914 are all prima facie evidence that for some reason 
or other agriculture, taken as a whole, had seen better days. The newly 
opened wheat areas made possible by the combine, and farmers who pur­
chased their farms at greatly discounted prices, of course, were among the 
exceptions.
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TABLE 4. ESTIMATED NATIONAL INCOME AND FARM INCOME AND THE ES­
TIMATED PER CAPITA INCOME OF NON-AGRICULTURAL 
















million $ million $ percent dollars dollars
1919 65,949 12,200 18.5 899 386
1920 73,999 11,026 14.9 988 349
1921 63,371 6,971 11.0 828 230
1922 65,925 7,318 11.1 844 230
1923 74,337 8,028 10.8 926 256
1924 77,135 8,331 10.8 939 268
1925 81,931 9,050 11.1 978 291
1926 84,238 8,087 9.6 982 263
1927 87,276 8,291 9 .5 993 274
1928 88,283 8,210 9.3 985 271
1929 91,405 8,226 9.0 1,001 272
1930 81,295 6,504 8.0 874 216
1931 67,000 4,690 7 .0 717 153
1932 52,500 3,675 7 .0 561 118
Source: Bean, L. H. and Chew, A. P. Economic Trends Affecting Agriculture. U. S. Dept, 
of Agr., p. 33. July, 1933.
1Nat’l. Bin:, of Ec. Research and U. S. Dept, of Agr.
•Nat’l Bur. of Ec. Research and U. S. Dept, of Agr. The percentage is based on the esti­
mate of farm income included in the estimate of national income, and not those shown in the 
table.
•Comparable percentages for 1929-32 are not available but current data indicate that in 
1931 and 1932 the farmers' share of the national income had declined to about 7 percent.
stood at about 11 percent from 1921 to 1925 and declined to 
9 percent by 1929. Moreover, it is estimated that for 1931 and 
1932 the farm income represented only 7 percent of the na­
tional income. In other words, the proportionate share of the 
national income which farmers received declined in the course 
of 10 years—1919 to 1929—from more than 18 percent to 9 
percent of the total. The farm population represented 30 per­
cent of the total population in 1919 and about 25 percent in 
1929. In other words, of the total purchasing power annually 
available to the people of this country, the share which farm 
people obtain as a group was reduced by one-half during the 
decade following the war. In this period the number of peo­
ple on farms declined only slightly, from about 31.6 million in 
1919 to 30.3 million in 1929.19 The agricultural depression was 
with us long before the slump in trade, which started in 1929, 
and which today so overshadows our perspective. It is, there1- 
fore, highly important that we understand what was respon­
sible for the depressed state of agriculture prior to 1929.
19 The total population is estimated at 105,003,000 for 1919 and 121,526,000 
in 1929.
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AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND THE WORLD WAR
The agricultural production of Europe fell off sharply during 
the World War. The reasons for this decline were many and 
need not detain us except to mention that Russia, one of the 
great food exporters, disappeared from the world’s market. 
Not only did European production drop, but, the demand for 
food in the belligerent countries increased. Agricultural ex­
ports from the United States niore than doubled. Europe 
needed food at any price. High food prices along with the 
immediate prospects for even higher prices, coupled with the 
pressure of an emergency—winning of the war—caused not 
only farmers but also governments to exert every possible 
effort to increase agricultural production. As a result, more 
acres were added to the farm plant of the United States and of 
other non-European countries. Farms were geared up to high­
er production, but even so, from 1914 to 1920, the decline in 
agricultural production in Europe was faster than the increase 
outside of Europe. Nevertheless, it was . during the war years 
and the brief post-war inflationary period that farmers, in­
duced by the then strong foreign demand, expanded. Since 
then foreign demand has shrunk below pre-war level, yet farm­
ers in the surplus countries have not adjusted their production 
accordingly.
Shifts in Crop Acreage
The story of what actually has taken place in the leading 
agricultural countries of the world because of the World War 
and because of subsequent events is graphically shown in fig. 5. 
Note first the changes in total crop acreage from 1909-13 to 
1920. Land devoted to crops in Europe, counting Russia, had 
declined over 100 million acres. Meanwhile, the acreage of 
important crops in the United States, Canada, Argentina and 
Australia, had increased nearly 60 million acres. Up until 
1920, therefore, it was chiefly a replacement proposition. The 
notable expansion in the non-European countries was more 
than offset by the decline suffered by war-torn Europe. The 
total crop acreage of the leading agricultural countries was 
materially reduced. Up until 1920, then, demand, if you 
please, exceeded supply. Prices were high. Farming was
24
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Fig. 5. Changes in total crop acreage, wheat acreage, number of 
hogs slaughtered of leading European and non-European countries since 
the World war.
profitable. Capital was attracted. Grass land was put to 
crops. Old land was recapitalized upward. All in all, it was 
the natural response to a strong- active demand for food.
Now follow the two curves in the first section of fig. 5 
through to 1932. From 1920 to 1925, again including Russia, 
Europe increased its crop land 78 million acres. The disloca­
tions in European agriculture brought about by the war were 
rapidly being corrected. Rehabilitation was in progress. Re­
covery was under way. But, whereas the amount of land in 
crops in Europe was approaching the pre-war level, the addi­
tional crop land that had been added in the non-European 
countries by the impetus of high war prices and the emergency 
demand for food continued to stay in farms.
Nor were the dislocations in world agricultural production 
corrected during the 5-year period that followed 1925. They 
were, if anything, further exaggerated. The crop acreage of 
Europe, not counting Russia, had got back to pre-war basis, 
while Russia had added over 20 million acres to its agricultural 
plant, thus increasing the area of farm land in crops for Eu-
25
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TABLE 5. CHANGES IN TOTAL CROP ACREAGE OF LEADING EUROPEAN AND 
NON-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.1 

















1909-13 av. 290 99 0 250 282 0
1920 321 125 +57 210 215’ -1 0 7
1925 321 125 +57 240 263 -2 9
1930 327 151 +89 250 303 +21
1932 320 140 +71 247 337 +52
Senate Document No. 70, 73d Congress, 1st Session. World Trade Barriers in Relation 
to American Agriculture. Prepared by Bur. of Agr. Ee., U. S. Dept, of Agr., 1933.
’Estimated.
rope as a whole. But, to add to the agricultural difficulties 
of the world the land in crops in Canada, Argentina and Au­
stralia jumped 26 million acres between 1925 and 1930. Instead 
of shrinking, the crop land in the non-European countries con­
tinued to increase. The European demand was fast being 
satisfied by its own farmers, yet the non-European world added 
more rather than less crop land.20
The explanation for the increase in crop acreage just noted, 
for the non-European countries, following 1925, is attributable 
largely to technical changes in farming. These technical de­
velopments were applicable very largely to farming on arable 
land. The combine had opened large areas of semi-arid land 
to the cultivation of wheat and other cereals. Technical de­
velopments in the arts of agriculture have been an important 
contributing factor to the agricultural maladjustments.
Nor did the crop acreage of the leading agricultural coun- 
tries*drop when the world slump set in. From 1930 to 1932, 
for which comparable data are available, Russia further ex­
panded its farm plant by nearly 35 million acres. Consequently 
1932 found Europe 52 million acres above the 1909-13 level, 
while the leading non-European countries had 75 million acres 
more in crops than before the war.
The area devoted to crops in Europe, including Russia and 
the four non-European countries under consideration, averag­
ed, it is estimated, 921 million acres from 1909 to 1913. In 
1932, these same countries had about 1,044 million acres, a 13 
percent increase. The decrease in consumption, particularly
20 From 1920 to 1930 there was a considerable shift in the United States 
from less productive to more productive areas. The acres in farm land in 
eastern and some of the southern states declined while the acreage in the cen­
tral states increased.
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of wheat, because of the high cost of wheat in the deficit coun­
tries of Europe, resulting from trade restrictions, must also be 
considered. It has been estimated, that the countries of Eu­
rope that import wheat are consuming annually about 175 
million bushels less than they had previously and that they are 
producing yearly about 150 million bushels more of wheat than 
they would have without governmental interventions.21
Influence of the War on Hog Slaughter
The war practically liquidated the hog industry in central 
Europe. In 1914, over 19 million hogs were slaughtered in 
Germany ; in 1919, slaughter dropped to less than iy2 million. 
While the European hog industry whs being liquidated, the 
number of hogs produced in the United States and Canada 
surged upward rapidly. Germany, Denmark and the Nether­
lands, the leading swine producing countries in Europe, 
slaughtered annually, from 1909 to 1913, slightly less than 20 
million head. By 1918, the combined slaughter of these coun­
tries had fallen to less than 3 million; the following year it 
reached an even lower point when only'2^4 million hogs were 
slaughtered. At the close of the war, Europe was producing 
about one-tenth as many hogs for slaughter as it did at the out­
break of hostility. Consequently, the demand for American 
pork and lard was extraordinary. It was not until after, the 
cessation of hostility that Germany could buy from us. At 
that time our exports of hog products expanded 200 percent, 
or the equivalent of 10 million hogs.
It was not until 1926 that the combined hog slaughter of the 
three leading European countries regained its pre-war volume. 
But once the hog industry of Europe recovered, it did not stop 
at its 1909-13 level. More and more hogs were farrowed and 
fed so that by 1931 European hog production was well over 50 
percent above pre-war levels.
Hog Expansion in America
In contrast to the drastic decline in hog numbers in Europe, 
production in 4 meriea was stimulated by the extraordinary
21 Senate Document No. 70. World Trade Barriers in Relation to Agricul­
ture. Prepared by the Bur. of Agr. Ec., U. S. Dept, of Agr., U. S. Congress 
73d, 1st session, pp. 167-171, 1933.
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TABLE 6. CHANGES IN HOG SLAUGHTER IN LEADING EUROPEAN 


























1,085 +  3,602
1915 38,381 +  6,622 13,293 2,594 842 -  3,053
1916 43,084 +11,325 6,548 2,542 850 -  9,842
1917 33,910 +  2,151 5,795 2,479 600 -10 ,908
1918 41,214 +  9,45& 2,430 324 217 -16,811
1919 41,812 5,526 +11,299 1,368 456 422 -17 ,536
1920 38,019 4,834 +  6,814 3,024 930 648 -15 ,180
1921 38,982 5,297 +  8,240 6,825 1,641 1,362 -  9,954
1922 43,114 5,382 +12,457 6,923 2,215 865 -  9,779
1923 53,334 6,056 +23,351 5,830 3,414 1,785 -  8,753
1924 52,873 6,625 +23,459 10,-527 4,024 2,768 -  2,463
1925 43,043 5,720 +12,724 12,090 3,766 2,810 -  1,116
1926 40,636 5,636 +10,233 13,072 3,838 2,440 -  432
1927 43,633 5,965 +13,559 17,279 5,098 3,041 +  5,626
1928 49,795 5,880 +19,636 19,480 5,373 3,077 +  8,148
1929 48,445 5,747 +18,153 17,252 4,994 2,415 +  4,879
1930 . 44,266 5,248 +13,475 18,041 6,132 2,746 +  7,137
1931 44,772 6,187 +14,920 20,520 7,320 3,900 +11,958
1932 45,244 7,504 +16,709 18,948 7,500 3,900 +10,566
■U. S. Dept, of Agr. Yearbooks of Agriculture.
demand of Europe for food. While it is true that the general 
trend in livestock numbers both in the United States and Can­
ada was upward, and while allowance must also be made for 
the periodic upward and downward swings in hog production 
referred to as the hog cycle, it, nevertheless, is very apparent 
that the American hog industry responded rapidly to the 
high prices of the war period.
In 1914, the domestic federally inspected slaughter was about 
32 million hogs. In 1916, we had increased to 43 million. 
Canadian hog slaughter also increased sharply. Figure 5 in­
dicates clearly that during the war period European hog pro­
duction fell more rapidly than it increased in America. De­
mand, borne out of the emergency, had expanded sharply; sup­
ply increased more slowly. At the close of the war central 
Europe found itself facing a famine, particularly in meat. Our 
pork and lard were needed most urgently. As a result, the 
peak in the foreign demand for pork and lard came immediate­
ly after the close of the war. Exports of hog products from 
the United States during 1919 were equivalent to more than 
15 million hogs. This was 10 million more than before the 
war. The expansion in exports at that time was considerably
28
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greater than the increase in domestic production. This may 
be taken as further evidence that the pressure of high prices 
had its origin in the European demand and that supplies were 
lagging in their adjustment.
Observe, also, that, it was not until about 1922 that hog pro­
duction in America had increased enough to replace the decline 
in number of hogs slaughtered in Europe. Up until that time, 
the combined slaughter of Europe and America was less than 
pre-war. Following this, however, Europe rapidly regained 
its former level of slaughter, and as in the case -of land devoted 
to crops, the hog industry in America, stimulated by the high 
prices of the war, did not contract in spite of the recovery of 
the hog industry in Europe and the disappearance of the for­
eign demand. In fact, today with the exports of hog products 
less than before the war, and only about one-third as large as 
the 1918-1919 level, the American farmers continue to produce 
as if there had been no change in the hog situation in Europe.
Non-Contractability of Agricultural Production
Temporarily, the World War gave us extremely profitable 
foreign markets in which to sell our surplus foodstuffs. Profits 
and patriotism, during the war, both operated to bring about 
agricultural expansion. But now that Europe has rehabilitated 
its farms, both crops and livestock, it no longer needs as much 
of our food as formerly. Yet the crop acreage that was added 
and the livestock' enterprise that was developed, during and 
immediately after the war, in America, and elsewhere, con­
tinues in production. It was indicated earlier that land once 
put under plow, is abandoned very slowly. Livestock produc­
tion, although more contractable than crop acreage, neverthe­
less resists liquidation most stubbornly.
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that changes in agri­
cultural supplies are essentially a one-way affair. Farming, 
especially in the newer regions, expands readily, but it con­
tracts only under tremendous economic pressure and during a 
general depression, not at all.
How low and 'how long must farm prices stay down in order 
to actually reduce the total agricultural production of the
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United States, let us say one-tenth? After 13 years of more or 
less chronic depression there are as. yet no signs that any sig­
nificant contraction is under way.22 How, then, can the disloca­
tions in agricultural production growing out of the world war 
be corrected ? It is this costly inheritance of war that we must 
face. It certainly has not been solved. Are more low prices 
the cure? A return of industrial prosperity with better wages 
and more jobs will improve the domestic demand for food, in­
asmuch as it will increase the purchasing power of a relatively 
large number of consumers. But it will not, of itself, correct 
the maladjustments in agricultural production that were usher­
ed in by the war. The agriculture of the world is sick and has 
been for 15 years. Can the United States attain the elements 
of a healthy agriculture independent of the rest of the world?
It is highly important to keep in mind in determining a poli­
cy that will solve the agricultural problem, that a boom in do­
mestic business does not mean that England, Germany, France 
and other leading food deficit countries will need more lard, 
wheat, apples or tobacco. It is true that foreigners may take 
more cotton; in fact, they already are buying more. But what 
about the important food exports from America? This export 
group still dominates American farming. It still sets the tempo 
of our agricultural wellbeing. It is this group that is tied ines­
capably into the price structure of the world. Changes since 
1914 in carryover, stocks on hand and acreage in cultivation, all 
point to serious dislocations in agricultural production. The 
World War forced too much of our production resources into 
farming, in view of what has transpired in the deficit food areas 
of the world since then. These dislocations must be faced frankly 
and squarely. Their solution is not easy.
It is this phase of the farm problem, the long run aspects of 
the agricultural depression, that the agricultural adjustment 
act is designed primarily to meet. For, certainly, in view of 
what has transpired since the World War our national farm 
plant is too large.
22 There has heen contraction in some sections of thé United States, as 
noted in footnote 20. During the more prosperous period in business a con­
siderable acreage in the eastern and southeastern states was abandoned for 
better opportunities in the cities. This contraction, however, has affected 
commercial agriculture very little.
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THE DECLINE IN AGRICULTURAL TRADE AS RELATED 
TO WORLD TRADE BARRIERS
It is not hard to understand why the crop acreage and live­
stock production, added as consequences of the war, have not 
been discontinued. But it is not so easy to explain why Europe 
has become much more self-sufficient in foodstuffs than before 
the war. The notable expansion in Russia is, of course, ex­
plainable. But how are we to account for the increased agri­
cultural production in the food deficit countries of Europe? 
More important still, why should Europe today try to produce 
all of her own food and, consequently, import as little as pos­
sible? Certainly this is quite different from pre-war condi­
tions when England, Germany, France and Italy, the major 
food deficit countries, willingly accepted and also found it easy 
to purchase our exportable surplus of food. In brief, we must 
explain why Europe is at present bending every effort possible 
to produce food at home, regardless of cost, instead of buying 
it from us. Our change from a debtor to a creditor country 
and our high tariff policy, in a large measure, tells, us why 
Europe has found it increasingly hard to earn enough dollars 
to buy from us.
United States Becomes Leading Creditor Nation23
The World War and subsequent events changed the United 
States from the world’s greatest debtor to that of leading 
creditor. Our country is today a mature creditor country. This 
international financial position is for us a new experience. As 
a nation, we are still debtor-minded. We continue to think and 
act like debtors. Our tariff policy has been, and is, the exact 
opposite to that suitable to a creditor country. We have thus 
far refused to ‘adjust our tariff policy to this changed financial 
situation.
. As already indicated, before 1914 the United States was a 
debtor country. We had imported much capital which we had 
borrowed largely from European citizens. Many of our rail­
roads and mining establishments were built largely with for-
23 Schultz, Theodore W . The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa. VIII. 
How Tariffs Affect Farm Prices, Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta., Cir. 146, Feb., 1933, 
gives a detailed analysis of the nature and purpose of tariffs and how inter­
national trade imports provide the ultimate payments that a nation receives 
for its exports.
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eign capital. If one subtracts the investments of Americans in 
foreign securities from the investments of foreigners in United 
States’ securities, the accounts, in 1914, stood about 3 billion 
dollars in favor of foreigners.
This net debt of the United States gave Europe an annual 
income of around 200 million dollars. Inasmuch as our ex­
ports exceeded our imports by about a half billion dollars year­
ly, outward interest payments provided foreigners with a large 
part of the dollars with which to pay for our favorable balance 
of trade. In spite of the fact that we restricted imports before 
the war, outward interest payments were an important factor 
making it possible for Europeans to buy more from us than we 
sold to them.
After the outbreak of the war our international financial 
position changed very rapidly. American securities held 
abroad, particularly those in the hands of the citizens of Great 
Britain, were sold in the United States. This process went on 
with such rapidity that by the time we entered the war in 
April, 1917, we had become a creditor nation.24
From 1917 to 1920, the United States government loaned to 
various European countries over 10 billion dollars. These funds 
were used largely to buy food and munitions- from us. Europe 
needed our food chiefly because of the collapse of her own agri­
cultural output at that time. But, it was largely by borrowing 
funds from us that European countries were able to buy the 
large amounts of American farm' produce that they did. The 
export of capital, particularly the loans of our Government to 
foreign governments, largely provided the purchasing power 
with which Europe paid for the food. Accordingly, the agri­
cultural expansion of that period, the prosperity of the war 
and the short post-war inflation are closely connected with our 
war loans during 1917 to 1920.
Trade After the War
In spite of our change from a debtor to a creditor country, 
the excess of commodity exports over imports was larger from 
1920 to 1930 than during the years immediately preceding the
24 A  part of the material of this section is based on Senate Document No. 
70, World Trade Barriers in Relation to American Agriculture, prepared by 
the Bur. of Agr. Ec., U. S. Dept, of Agr., 1983. See also, Cirs. 146 and 148 of 
the Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta., prepared last year by the writer.
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war. This unbalanced situation was partly offset by large ex­
penditures of American tourists abroad. But much more im­
portant were the funds made available through our foreign 
lending. In brief, Europe continued to borrow and we ex­
ported. They sent us long term bonds and we sent them bread 
and meat. Thus, until 1930, we maintained a large part of our 
export trade, in spite of the bald fact that foreigners were un­
able to earn enough dollars to pay for the commodities that 
they bought from us. Up until 1930, net capital investments 
abroad practically covered our trade balance.25
American Tariff Policy
If foreign importers are to buy American produce they must 
find it possible to sell their goods and services to American citi­
zens. If, because of trade barriers, they are unable to do so 
they have the alternative of borrowing dollars from us with 
which to buy American products and services. The alterna­
tive, however, is at best, temporary. But because foreigners 
were able to borrow, our foreign trade continued to go on, until 
1930, in spite of the restrictions that our tariff policy placed 
upon imports, which in the final analysis are the payments 
which foreigners make for our exports.
Despite our new status as a creditor country, the American 
tariff was raised successively in 1921, 1922 and in 1930. High­
er, ever higher, we built our tariff wall, thereby shutting out 
foreign goods; yet we were anxious to sell our farm surpluses 
abroad and at the same time collect the war debt. The Ameri­
can tariff clearly f1 limited the increase of American exports up 
to 1929, contributed to their decline thereafter, and is now one 
of the obstacles to their revival.” 26
How much of the depression in agriculture is attributable to 
the tariff, of course, cannot be determined but the conjuncture of 
our, creditor position and our high tariff policy has been one 
among several factors that has seriously impeded the export of 
farm commodities. This, in turn, certainly has contributed to 
the prolonged and chronic depression so evident in the export 
group of farm commodities ever since 1920.
25 Schultz, Theodore W . Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta., Cir. 146 (cited earlier), table 
i' Page 147, gives the balance of international payments of the United States 
for calendar years 1922 to 1931.
28 Senate Document No. 70. Cited earlier, p. 28.
33
Schultz: Prospects for agricultural recovery V. Is our national farm plant
Published by Iowa State University Digital Repository, 1933
122
The American tariff stands as an important barrier to foreign 
buying. It curtails foreign purchasing power for American 
farm products and, therefore, seriously impedes our exports of 
agricultural commodities.
World Trade Barriers Abroad
The geographical distribution of crops and livestock, in all 
probability, would be materially different today were it not for 
trade barriers. The recovery and expansion of European agri­
cultural production, already discussed, was brought about 
partly by import restrictions. In considering the situation 
with respect to European trade barriers, it will be helpful to 
divide the post-war period into three major phases.27
Trade Restrictions Prevalent, 1918 to 1925
From 1918 to 1925, severe trade restrictions and extremely 
high tariffs prevailed. It is not easy, however, to classify the 
reasons back of the determined actions of European govern­
ments to restrict trade. Among others, the following factors 
played an important part:
1. The World War had aroused an intense spirit of political 
and economic nationalism.
2. The new states that were created by the Versailles Treaty 
aspired to national self-sufficiency. Many of the boundaries 
of these newly created countries cut right across previously ex­
isting economic areas.
3. Trade restrictions were frequently employed to maintain 
and obtain favorable balances of trade. The objective was to 
stabilize the foreign exchange value of their currency.
4. The acute instability of certain national currencies led 
to severe trade restrictions.
5. The desire to protect old industries or to shelter new ones 
that had started during the war was a further motive for 
trade barriers. Agrarian unrest and the fear of social revolu­
tion caused some countries to protect and placate their farmers 
in order to insure greater social stability.
27 Based largely upon chapters 2 and 3 of Senate Document No. 70. Cited 
earlier. Also see Ezekiel and Bean. Cited earlier, pp. 13-19.
34
Bulletin, Vol. 27 [1933], No. 314, Art. 1
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/bulletin/vol27/iss314/1
123
6. Tariffs were enacted to produce revenues, the need for 
which had been greatly increased by the war.
7. Some tariffs were raised for the expressed purpose of 
using them in tariff bargaining with other countries.
In general, industrial products suffered much more from the 
early post-war wave of trade restrictions than did agricultural 
products. The need for food for several years after the close 
of hostility of a number of the former belligerent countries was 
so great that they were compelled to allow imports to enter 
without restriction.
Trend Toward Moderation. 1925 to 1929
From 1925 to 1929 there was a definite trend toward a mod­
eration of tariffs. A certain amount of stability was in evi­
dence. The wave of tariff increases of the preceding period 
flattened out. It is true that trade barriers continued high, but 
more stable conditions of trade were achieved and, in some 
cases, tariffs were actually reduced.
During this period there was a tendency to eliminate direct 
restrictions. Germany, for example, late in 1925, after it had 
succeeded in stabilizing its currency abolished its import and 
export licensing. Some of the principal factors that wnre re­
sponsible for the moderation of trade barriers from 1925 to 
1929 were:
(1) After 1924 Europe achieved considerably more finan­
cial and economic stability.
(2) Many commercial agreements were negotiated which 
provided against further tariff increases.
(3) The World Economic Conference held, late in the 
spring of 1927, prepared the way for checking further tariff 
increases.
(4) Wide use was made of bilateral tariff adjustments and 
there was a much wider recognition of the policy of equality 
of treatment.
(5) Considerable progress was also made through multi­
lateral action.
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Agricultural Protectionism Since 1929
Since 1929 foreign trade, especially in farm commodities, has 
all but come to a standstill because of the widespread and un­
precedented increase in trade barriers. In practically every 
country, farmers dependent upon foreign markets have suf­
fered much more than those who are producing commodities 
which are on an import basis.
The new upward trend in trade barriers received its chief 
impetus from the collapse of prices in 1929. Restrictions 
against agricultural products went to more extreme lengths 
than ever before in modern history. Europe protected its agri­
culture more and more, largely for the following reasons:
(1) After the internal scarcity of food in post-war Europe 
was over, European farmers, who up to that time had received 
unequal tariff treatment, were accorded protection.
(2) Agricultural protectionism in Europe had its start with 
the adoption of the German tariff law of 1925. Although 
licensing was discontinued, this law placed high duties on all 
of the important food imports.
(3) War clouds again began to loom. European people, 
who suffered famine during the World War, are an important 
element in bringing about more protection for farmers in the 
hope that their respective countries may become self-sufficient 
in food.
(4) Debtor countries felt themselves forced to tighten im­
port restrictions in the hope of producing a more favorable and 
active trade balance so as to be able to meet heavy external 
financial commitments.
(5) The return of Russia, as an exporter of foodstuffs, dra­
matically called attention to the ever mounting unsalable sur­
pluses, particularly of cereals.
(6) As the depression deepened it became increasingly dif­
ficult for governments, as well as for individuals, to make out­
ward international payments. This in turn led to further re­
strictions upon imports, governments thereby hoping to in­
crease the available foreign exchange necessary for outward 
financial transactions.
(7) In the summer of 1931, there came the financial collapse 
of the Austrian Credit-Anstalt which quickly spread financial
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disorder over all of Europe and from which there followed a 
network of arbitrary controls over foreign trade on a plane 
unparalleled during peace times.
SHRINK AGRICULTURE OR SHIFT TARIFF 
PROTECTED INDUSTRIES
Our foreign trade is at present badly disrupted. A tariff 
crisis paralyzes international trade. Domestic farm prices 
show the consequences. At the same time our debtors abroad, 
both public and private, are forced to default. The loss of for­
eign markets, moreover, has destroyed the fundamental balance 
between agriculture and industry in our national economic life.
There are, however, several correctives at work mending the 
fabric of foreign trade. But it is important to observe that the 
burden of these correctives falls with ruthless severity upon 
the American farmer. In substance, the adjustments now tak­
ing place in foreign trade are simply reducing the exports of 
commodities from the United States enough to balance our in­
ternational incoming and outgoing payments to fit our creditor 
position.
While it may be true that there is comparatively little that 
the United States can do to improve the European situation, 
with reference to trade barriers, we can at least set our own 
house in order. We can relieve the undue economic pressure 
upon agriculture,, to a considerable extent, by reversing our 
tariff policy. It seems well to repeat what we said in this con­
nection a year ago.- The alternative of shrinking agriculture 
is to increase imports. “  To bring this about involves a grad­
ual, yet definite, scaling down of our tariff wall. A downward 
adjustment of tariffs would tend to throw some of the burden 
of reestablishing foreign trade upon protected industries. Some 
business dislocations would result. Manufacturers at present 
supported by high and often prohibitive tariffs would have to 
meet" foreign competition or shift into fields better suited to 
the economy of the United States. '
“ From a long trend national viewpoint this would be a de­
sirable adjustment. Lowering tariffs to permit enough of an 
increase in imports of diversified manufacturers to make it pos­
sible for our farmers and export manufacturers to hold their
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foreign markets would do two things: (1) maintain those in­
dustries that have in their production the greatest comparative 
advantage and (2) reduce those least effective in using Ameri­
can workers and resources. The ultimate result would be to 
raise the standard of living of the people of the United States.
“  Prompt reduction of tariffs and the moderation of other 
trade barriers is highly desirable. This action is basic to the 
reestablishment of our export trade, which, in turn, is basic to 
the restoration of the fundamental balance in our national eco­
nomic life. . . -.
“ But desirable as it may be to lower tariffs it should be real­
ized that this cannot be done in 1 or 2 years. Even under the 
most favorable circumstances it will probably take from 5 to 
10 years to effect a substantial reduction of prevailing domestic 
and foreign trade barriers. Then, too, serious dislocations 
would result if all tariffs Were suddenly removed or even sharp­
ly reduced. There are many reasons why the process should 
be carried out gradually, the chief one being that it would give 
the tariff-supported industries an opportunity to shift to more 
productive enterprises. Meanwhile, what will happen to the 
American producer who has lost his foreign market ? Until our 
foreign trade is reestablished, that is, until imports are in­
creased, exports must be reduced. Therefore, temporarily at 
least, some plan to facilitate the orderly retreat of our cotton, 
wheat, hog and tobacco producers is not only desirable but in 
all probability essential. While our national trade policies are 
being adjusted to fit our creditor position, sight should not be 
lost of the fact that the American farmer is carrying most of 
the burden of the adjustments now taking place; hence, he is 
entitled to first consideration in any relief program.” 28
The First Phase to Recovery
The Agricultural Adjustment Act created the governmental 
machinery which facilitates the orderly retreat of the cotton, 
wheat, tobacco, rice and of the corn-hog farmers. Beef cattle 
and dairying have also been included recently. The national 
emergency in agriculture demanded immediate action to re-
28 Schultz, Theodore W . Agricultural Emergency in Iowa. X . Shrink 
Agriculture or Shift Tariff Protected Industries. Iowa Agr. Exp. Sta., Cir. 148 
(see foreword and pages 209-210). March, 1933.
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lieve, particularly those farmers dependent upon foreign out­
lets. The reduction of production has been the first phase of 
the farm recovery program, and properly so. This part of the 
program is still in its early stages, the corn-hog reduction con­
tracts are just being signed. It, undoubtedly, is more than a 
one-year job ; for, it is apparent, that the abnormal stocks that 
have accumulated in the basic commodities will not, in most 
cases, be back to normal that soon. Except for cotton, improve­
ment in business generally will not increase materially the level 
of consumption of the American people. Obviously, there is 
no conceivable way by which the supply and demand for our 
export farm commodities can be balanced within the United 
States. Consumer demand for food cannot be increased much. 
Nor can industrial uses for farm produce be expanded rapidly, 
and it is not possible to cut acreage enough. Our national farm 
plant is too large for our present population and in spite of any 
reasonable curtailment will continue to be too large unless we 
reestablish foreign trade.
The Next Phase in Farm Recovery
It is now necessary to develop a sound commercial policy 
aimed at the reduction of those barriers that stand in the way 
of the recovery of our foreign trade. It is, certainly, impossi­
ble to adjust farm production to a domestic basis. Consequent­
ly, since it is necessary for us to sell a substantial part of our 
basic farm commodities abroad, it is essential that foreigners 
be permitted to earn enough dollars to buy these commodities 
from us. In the long pull, unless we want to give them the 
dollars or add to our already large amount of bad debts abroad, 
there is only one way by which they can earn dollars. They 
must find it possible to sell to us those goods and services which 
they can produce better than we can.
The next phase of the farm recovery program involves two 
important steps. First, the federal government must work out 
ways and means of putting into operation the basic principles 
of a sound commercial policy. The heart of such a policy must 
be to reduce tariff protection now given to the relatively ineffi­
cient producers, 'who by that token are least suited to the 
economy of the United States. Carrying out such a policy
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would make it possible for the more efficient producers to rees­
tablish their export markets. Second, because of the long 
strides that Europe has made toward self-sufficiency in foods, 
and because of the improvements in agricultural production 
techniques in some of our competing countries, particularly in 
the countries growing wheat, it will be necessary to recognize 
that even though Europeans are able to earn dollars they will 
not take pre-war quantities of all of our farm produce. In 
other words, we must determine in which farm commodities we 
have the best likelihood of strong foreign markets and in 
which, the least. Cotton, for example, even today is not penal­
ized by tariffs or quotas abroad. Given the possibility of earn­
ing dollars, Europeans will readily buy our cotton. In con­
trast, in wheat it is doubtful whether we ever again will sell any 
substantial volume abroad. Lard is the important export prod­
uct originating in the Corn Belt. Where does lard stand in 
foreign trade? How strong is its competitive position? Given 
a sound foreign trade policy can we recover our European, Cu­
ban and Mexican outlets? The competitive position of lard in 
both the domestic and foreign markets will be considered in a 
later bulletin of this series.
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